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CHAPTER 1 
Torts 
JAMES W. SMITH* 
A. NEGLIGENCE 
§1.1. Overruling Established Common Law: Retroactivity. In a 
case decided during the Survey year, Bouchard v. DeGagne, 1 the Su-
preme Judicial Court held that the rule established in the 1973 deci-
sion of Mounsey v. Ellard2 is to be applied retroactively. In Mounsey, 
the Supreme Judicial Court overruled a long-standing common law 
rule that distinguished among business invitees, social invitees, and 
licensees as regards the duty of care owed them by an owner or oc-
cupier of land. The Court in Mounsey held that an owner or occupier 
of land owes a duty of reasonable care to all lawful visitors on the 
land, but did not change the rule that a trespasser is owed only the 
lesser duty of avoiding willful and wanton conduct.3 The Court did 
not express an opinion on whether the rule should be applied retroac-
tively or merely prospectively. 
The accident that resulted in the injuries to the plaintiff in Bouchard 
occurred after the date of the injury in the Mounsey case but before 
the Court's decision in Mounsey. 4 The plaintiff in Bouchard argued that 
since the Court applied the new rule retroactively in favor of the 
plaintiff in Mounsey, the rule should be applied retroactively at least as 
far back as the date of the injury in Mounsey. 5 Although the Court re-
jected the plaintiffs suggestion that retroactive application necessarily 
followed from the Court's applying the new rule in Mounsey itself,6 it 
concluded that retroactive application was appropriate because of the 
absence of substantial reliance on the old rule. 7 
*jAMES W. SMITH is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§l.l. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1856, 1856-57,329 N.E.2d 114. 
2 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 871, 297 N.E.2d 43, discussed in Note, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. 
LAW § ll.l7, at 325-49. 
3 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 871, 885-88, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-53. But see Pridgen v. Boston 
Housing Auth'y, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245, 308 N.E.2d 467 (discovery of an imperiled 
trespasser), discussed in Smith, Torts, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW § 6.8, at 116-19. 
4 Bouchard, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1861,329 N.E.2d at 116. 
5 !d. at 1861, 329 N.E.2d at 116. 
6 !d. at 1861-62, 329 N.E.2d at 116. 
7 !d. at 1862-63, 329 N.E.2d at 116. 
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Whenever an appellate court re-examines an estab ished common 
law rule and finds it wanting, it is faced with a secon question: has 
the party opposing the change (and others similarly ituated) relied 
upon the established rule in shaping his conduct so th t a retroactive 
application of the new law would operate unfairly?8 F ur options are 
available to the court. First, the court may apply the rid, established 
rule to the case at bar but issue a warning in its opinioi that the court 
looks with disfavor on the established rule.9 The warn"ng is often ac-
companied by a statement of intent to abolish the est blished rule at 
some future time. 10 This threat may be a conditional ne, where, for 
example, the court seeks a legislative solution to the roblem.U Sec-
ond, the court may actually purport to overrule the stablished rule 
but refuse to apply the new rule to the case at bar or to transactions 
or occurrences that took place prior to the announce change. This 
so-called "prospective overruling" approach12 has withs ood a constitu-
tional attack in the United States Supreme Court.13 hird, the court 
may apply the new rule to the case at bar but refus to apply it to 
other transactions or occurrences that took place p ·or to the an-
nounced change.14 This approach meets an objection o the first and 
second approaches that, unless litigants who have i curred the ex-
pense involved in changing the established rule obtai the benefit of 
that change, outmoded common law rules will e perpetuated 
8 Reliance is particularly a problem in the property area (includi g the area of wills 
and trusts) where titles to property are involved, and in the contr ct area where the 
parties have deliberately shaped their conduct in reliance on the es ablished rule. It is 
usually less of a problem in the torts area, particularly in negligence cases. But see Colby 
v. Carney Hospital, 356 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969), discusse in Smith, Medical 
Malpractice, 1972 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAw § 15.3, at 375; Higgins v. Emerson Hospital, 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1499, 328 N.E.2d 488, discussed in § 1.4, infra. 
9 For a variation of this approach, see Morash & Sons, Inc. v. C mmonwealth, 1973 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 785, 296 N.E.2d 461, discussed in Smith, Torts, 197 ANN. SuRv. MASS. 
LAW§ 11.2, at 306-07. In Morash, the Supreme Judicial Court carve out a very narrow 
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and issued a war ing as to the doc-
trine generally. Notwithstanding this warning, in Hannigan v. New ama-Delta Chapter 
of Kappa Sigma Fraternity, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1416, 1421, 3 7 N.E.2d 882, 885, 
discussed in §1.3, infra, the Supreme Judicial Court still refrained fro ~enerally abolish-
ing the doctrine of sovereign immunity , pointing out that there is g:tslative activity in 
~~L ' 
10 E.g., Colby v. Carney Hospital, 356 Mass. 527, 528, 254 N.E.2d ~07, 408 (1969). 
11 E.g., Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 1973 Mass. Adv. &h. 785, 296 N.E.2d 
461. i 
12 For a comprehensive treatment of this subject, see Levy, Rea"-st jurisprudence and 
Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1960). ! 
13 Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 363-66 ( 932). 
14 Cf Mcintyre v. Associates Financial Serv. Co., 1975 Mass. Ad\ h. 1490, 1496, 328 
N.E.2d 492, 495, holding that real estate attachments made befor .... Fuentes v. Shevin, 
407 U.S. 67 (1972), are valid. Although two courts were involved h re, the principle is 
similar. 
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through lack of incentive to change them. 15 Fourth, when the court 
finds little or no reliance on the established rule, it may apply the new 
rule retroactively. Tort cases most often fall in this category. 16 
Thus, in taking the fourth approach in Bouchard, the Court 
reasoned that the "precautionary conduct of this or almost any other 
landowner almost certainly was not based on any appreciation of the 
subtle distinctions between invitees, and social guests and licensees."17 
The Court also concluded that the problems of insurance coverage 
were almost certain to be minimal, partially because "the .heavy bur-
den of proof imposed under the gross negligence requirement of the 
old rule had been substantially undermined by a large number of 
cases which held that an economic benefit had been conferred on the 
landowner by the presence and purpose of his guest."18 
§ 1.2. Product Liability: Evidence of Post-Sale, Pre-Accident 
Improvements. In doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court considered the admissibility in a negligence action of evidence 
of design improvements that were made in a machine's safety features 
after an unimproved machine was sold to the plaintiffs employer, but 
before the plaintiff was injured by that machine. The Court upheld 
the lower court's admission of the post-sale, pre-accident improve-
ments for three purposes: "(1) to demonstrate the feasibility of rede-
sign of the machine's safety features; (2) to show [the 
defendant-manufacturer's] knowledge, if any, of inadequacies in the 
'existing safety features' of the [machine]; and (3) to establish [the 
defendant-manufacturer's] duty to warn purchasers of the [machine] 
of any deficiency in the [machine's] safety features."2 The jury had 
been instructed that the evidence of safety improvements was not in 
and of itself evidence of negligence. 3 
The plaintiff in doCanto was injured when her hand was caught in a 
commercial ironer manufactured by the defendant. Although the 
electricity that powered the ironer shut off when the plaintiffs hand 
activated the safety mechanism, the momentum of the rollers in the 
ironer (described as overtravel) caused her hand to be pulled farther 
into the machine. 4 The plaintiff was allowed at trial, over the 
defendant's objections, to introduce evidence of an improvement in 
15 For an extreme application of this approach in a mass injury tort case, see Molitor 
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 29 Ill. App. 2d 471, 476-77, 173 N.E.2d 
599, 602 (1961), where the court applied the new rule to some, but not all, of the vic-
tims of the same accident. Fortunately, this decision was ultimately reversed by the Il-
linois Supreme Court. 24 Ill. 2d 467, 470, 182 N.E.2d 145, 146-47 (1962). 
16 See, e.g., Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1263, 1277-78, 302 N.E.2d 
555, 564, discussed in Note, 1973 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW § 1l.l9, at 369-87 . 
. 
17 Id. at 1862-63, 329 N.E.2d at 116. 
18 /d. at 1863,329 N.E.2d at 117. 
§1.2. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1591, 328 N.E.2d 873. 
2 Id. at 1594, 328 N.E.2d at 876. 
3 /d. 
4 Id. at 1592, 328 N.E.2d at 875. 
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the ironer that reduced the overtravel and moved the safety bar 
further from the rollers. The plaintiffs action against the manufac-
turer of the machine rested upon negligence in the design of the 
machine5 and the manufacturer's failure to inform purchasers of the 
machine: (1) of the risk created by the negligent desigp,6 and (2) that, 
subsequent to the sale, it had developed an impr~vement in the 
machine that eliminated the overtravel. 7 , 
The Court's holding that the evidence of the impro~ement was ad-
missible on the issue of defendant's negligence in f~iling to inform 
purchasers of the risk and subsequent improvemen~ seems correct. 
There was evidence at trial that the overtravel in the ironer was 
known to the defendant's designer and there was testimony by the de-
signer that the improvement could have been incorporated into the 
old ironers at a small cost. 8 Even if there had not been any negligence 
in the design of the original machine, a case of negligence would 
seem to be proved by the failure of the manufacturer to notify pur-
chasers of the original machine that a safety improvrment could be 
incorporated into the machine at a small cost. i 
The admission of the evidence of the improvement! on the issue of 
negligence in the original design is questionable. Oii this issue, the 
trial judge admitted the evidence for the purpose qf showing "the 
feasibility of redesign of the machine's safety features."9 By "feasibil-
ity," the trial judge and the Court apparently meant the practical pos-
sibility of defendant's making the improvement. 
The Supreme Judicial Court established the admissibility of evi-
dence of subsequent repairs to show practical possibility in 1907, in 
Beverley v. Boston Elevated Railway Co. 10 The Court he~d that evidence 
of post-accident improvements was admissible to pro~e the practical 
possibility, with regard to the conduct of defendant's bt,Isiness, of mak-
ing such a safety improvement where defendant's counsel refused to 
concede such. The Court in Beverley stated: "For this !purpose, under 
this condition of the evidence and of the contentio~ made by the 
defendant, the evidence was competent."11 
Five years later, in Coy v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 12 the Supreme 
Judicial Court, without citation of authority on the point, held that 
evidence of a subsequent improvement (a fence) was admissible to 
show practical possibility, with regard to the defendant's business, 
even though defendant's counsel conceded that the in)provement was 
possible. Subsequently, in the 19 17 decision of Co,ry v. Boston & 
5 Id; at 1598-99, 328 N.E.2d at 877. 
6 Id. at 1599, 1602, 328 N.E.2d at 877, 878. 
7 Id. at 1061-62, 328 N.E.2d at 878. 
8 Brief for Plaintiff at 9, doCanto. 
9 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1594, 328 N.E.2d at 876. 
10 194 Mass. 450, 458, 80 N.E. 507, 508 (1907). 
11 Id. at 458, 80 N.E. at 508 (emphasis added). 
12 212 Mass. 307,309-10, 98 N.E. 1041, 1042 (1912) 
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Maine Railroad, 13 the Court sustained defendant's objection to the ad-
mission of a subsequent improvement (again a fence) "because there 
was no evidence that the defendant contended that it was either im-
possible or impracticable to erect and maintain the fence as it was in 
fact erected."14 The Court distinguished Beverley on this point15 and 
made no reference to Coy. The issue has lain dormant since Conry 
until doCanto. 
On appeal in doCanto, the defendant, citing Beverley, argued that the· 
evidence of the improvement should be inadmissible since the defen-
dant had conceded that the improvement was practical. The Court 
disagreed, citing Coy, and held that the evidence of the improvement. 
in the ironer did not become inadmissible simply because defendant 
conceded that the design improvement was feasible; further, the 
Court rejected "any suggestion to the contrary in Conry v. Boston & 
Maine R.R."16 
The Court's admission of the evidence of the improvement for the 
purpose of showing practical possibility is unsound. Practical possibil-
ity is a factor in balancing the burden on the defendant of avoiding 
harm to the plaintiff against the risk and gravity of that harm. With a 
technological development, as opposed to a fence, however, the ques-
tion of practical possibility does not even arise until it is established 
that the development was known or discoverable at the time of the, 
original design. The improvement in doCanto was made after the 
ironer that injured the plaintiff was sold to her employer. There was 
no expert testimony that this improvement device was discoverable by 
the exercise of ordinary care at the time the original ironer was man-
ufactured. Technological developments are not the same as fences 
and ought to be treated differently. This is not to say that a jury, in 
an appropriate case, would be unable, based upon its own knowled~e 
and experience, to conclude that a manufacturer was negligent m 
placing in the market a machine that carried a certain degree of risk. 
Rather, what appears improper is allowing a jury to reach the ques-
tion of practical possibility without expert help on the discovenibility 
question. The mere fact of a subsequent improvement does not estab-
lish that the improvement was discoverable at the time of the original 
manufacture. Nor, even if discoverability were conceded, would the 
fact of subsequent improvement necessarily establish practical possibil-
ity. Whether, if discoverability were conceded, the jury should be al-
lowed to determine practical possibility without expert testimony 
would depend upon the nature of the improvement. 17 The precedent 
13 227 Mass. 411, 116 N.E. 733 (19\7). 
14 /d. at 414, 116 N.E. at 734. 
15 Id. 
16 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1596, 328 N.E.2d at 876. 
17 Cf Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120, 130 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1955). 
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IS even more devastating when applied to the breach of warranty 
area. 18 
The Court's decision is also questionable as a matter of policy. In 
Massachusetts, as in most states, evidence of post-accident repairs or 
improvements is inadmissible to prove negligence. 19 (Exclusion of this 
evidence for that purpose rests upon the belief tha~ a contrary rule 
would discourage owners from correcting property tlefects following 
an accident out of fear that such correction would ~mount to an ad-
mission of prior negligence. ' 
On appeal in doCanto, the defendant argued that the policy behind 
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent repairs and improvements 
applied with like force to pre-injury improvements. The Court dis-
claimed a parallel policy issue on the basis that in pre-accident situa-
tions there is no vested tort claim inhibiting such improvements and 
that other economic factors (e.g., reduction of pot ntial future tort 
claims) will tend to encourage such improvements. 0 On the other 
hand, unlike the usual repair situation involving on y one item (e.g., 
stairs), a· manufacturer's improvement will relate to terns that are in 
the hands of numerous users. The admission in ev dence of a pre-
accident improvement, developed after the original items had been 
sold, to establish that such improvement was feasib at the time of 
the original design, may tend to discourage the development of such 
improvement in the same manner that the subsequent repair of an 
isolated item after an accident would be discouraged by the rejection 
of the subsequent repairs rule. 
B. IMMUNITY 
i 
§1.3. Immunity: Commonwealth of Massachusels. In the 1973 
decision of Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 1 the upreme Judicial 
Court pointed out persuasive reasons for abolishing tate and munici-
pal immunity, but refrained from doing so judicially, concluding that 
such a sweeping change could better be accomplished by the 
Legislature. 2 Although no legislation abolishing or limiting sovereign 
immunity has been enacted in the two years following Morash, in 
Hannigan v. New Gamma-Delta Chapter of Kappa Sigma Fraternity, Inc., 3 
18 See G.L. c. 106, § 2-318, which extends the scope of a seller's liability for breach of 
his express or implied warranty. i 
19 National Laundry Co. v. City of Newton, 300 Mass. 126, 127,! 14 N.E.2d 108, 109 
(1938); Shinners V. Proprietors of Locks & Canals on Merrimack ~iver, 154 Mass. 168, 
28 N.E. 10 (1891). Such evidence has, however, been admitted f~r other purposes, as 
for example, to establish plaintiffs control over the area of the accjdent. Finn v. Peters, 
340 Mass. 622, 625, 165 N.E.2d 896, 898 (1960). 
20 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1596 n.3, 328 N.E.2d at 876 n.3. 
§1.3. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 785, 296 N.E.2d 461, discussed in Smith, Torts, 1973 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW§ 11.2, at 306-07; Note, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 11.18, at 349-69. 
2 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 795-96, 296 N.E.2d at 468. 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1416, 327 N.E.2d 882. 
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decided during the Survey year, the Court again refrained from 
abolishing the doctrine. Noting that since Morash, legislation has been 
filed and has been referred to the Judicial Council, the Court stated 
that it would continue to refrain from abolishing sovereign immunity 
until the Legislature acts or until events demonstrate that it does not 
intend to act. 4 
There are several reasons why legislative abolition is preferable. Ex-
ceptions and limitations, based upon considerations of justice and 
public policy, can best be expressed in a comprehensive plan, a mode 
not available to the judiciary. The Legislature also has the machinery 
for giving all interested parties the opportunity to raise their particu-
lar problems; the court hears only those claims and points of view 
voiced by the particular litigants, with the occasional assistance of an 
amicus brief. Finally, the prospective effect of legislation working such 
a sweeping change is to be preferred over retroactive judicial law. 
§1.4. Charitable Immunity: Non-Retroactivity. In two decisions 
during the Survey year, Higgins v. Emerson Hospitafl and Johnson v. 
Wesson Women's Hospital, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court applied the doc-
trine of charitable immunity to torts occurring in the interim period 
between the Court's 1969 decision in Colby v. Carney Hospital3 and the 
enactment in 1971 of section 85K of chapter 231 of the General Laws. 
In Colby, the Supreme Judicial Court, impatient with the 
Legislature's failure to abolish or limit the doctrine of charitable im-
munity, declared its intention to abolish the doctrine judicially at the 
next opportunity. 4 By the time the next opportunity occurred in 
1972, in Ricker v. Northeastern University, 5 the Legislature had re-
sponded, by enactng section 85K of chapter 231 of the General Laws, 
which abolishes the doctrine of immunity but limits the liability of 
charities for their torts to $20,000. 6 Because of this legislative action, 
the Supreme Judicial Court applied the charitable immunity doctrine 
in Ricker; 1 the Court also refused to give any retrospective effect to 
the statute.8 It should be noted, however, that the tort in Ricker 
occurred before the Colby warning; on a reliance concept, therefore, 
the Ricker result was correct. 
Two questions remained unanswered after Ricker: (1) is the doctrine 
of charitable immunity applicable for interim cases, where the alleged 
tort occurred after the Colby warning but prior to the effective date of 
the statute limiting charitable immunity; and (2) does the fact that the 
defendant-charity carried liability insurance at the time the tort 
4 !d. at 1421-22, 327 N.E.2d at 885. 
§1.4. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1499, 1500-01, 328 N.E.2d 488,489. 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1504, 1505, 328 N.E.2d 490, 491. 
3 356 Mass. 527, 528, 254 N .E.2d 407, 408 (1969). 
4 !d. 
5 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 299, 279 N.E.2d 671. 
6 G.L. c. 231, § 85K. 
7 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 302, 279 N.E.2d at 673. 
8 Id. at 301-02, 279 N.E.2d at 673. 
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I 
occurred (perhaps in reliance on the Colby warning), I have any rele-
vance to the issue of its liability? . 
The Court in Higgins and Johnson applied the doctrine to post-Colby 
torts, and in Johnson held that the presence of liability insurance has 
no effect on the operation of the doctrine. 9 1 
Although the torts in Higgins and Johnson occurred after the Colby 
warning, the Court's refusal to abolish the doctrine of charitable im-
munity appears correct. 10 Although precedent exists for the judicial 
abolition of a common law doctrine in anticipation ?f the effective 
date of a statute abolishing the doctrine, 11 practical Hifficulties mili-
tated against following such precedent in Higgins anp Johnson. The 
legislative response to the Colby warning was not a tdtal abolition of 
the doctrine; rather, it limited the liability of a charity for its torts to 
$20,000. Abolition of the doctrine in interim cases \fould have im-
posed unlimited liability on charities, frustrating rather than enhanc-
ing the clear legislative purpose to provide charities ~ limited immu-
nity. Also, such abolition could have had devastating results to a char-
ity that had acquired liability insurance based upon thle $20,000 limi-
tation of liability set out in the statute. · 
The second question left unanswered after Ricker w~s raised in the 
Johnson case: whether the defendant-charity's purcha$e of a liability 
insurance policy covering the period when the alleged tort occurred 
constituted a waiver of the defense of charitable immuhity. The Court 
answered this question in the negative. This ruling also seems correct. 
As the Court in Johnson points out, 12 no inference of ~ waiver is war-
ranted by the purchase of insurance. Likewise, in the absence of legis-
lation so indicating, no such presumption is warranted. I 
On the other hand, legislation adopting a presumption of waiver of 
limited liability where the charity is insured in excrss of $20,000 
would appear advisable. The insurance company, which is the in-
terested party in such cases, should be estopped by it~ acceptance of 
premiums covering liability over $20,000 from attempting to limit the 
insured's liability to $20,000. Perhaps legislation could require that a 
liability policy covering a charity for over $20,000 cont~in a statement 
that the insured and insurer waive the defense of charitable immunity 
up to the amount of the coverage in the policy. 13 
9 197 5 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1506, 328 N .E.2d at 491. , 
10 It is unlikely that the Supreme Judicial Court lost any credibility1 as the result of its 
refusal to carry out the Colby warning. A fair reading of Colby does not indicate that the 
Court has prospectively overruled the doctrine of charitable immulnity; rather, it re-
veals that a legislative response to the problem would stay the Court's hand. This is 
what occurred. . 
11 See Warner v. Whitman, 353 Mass. 468,472, 233 N.E.2d 14, 16-117 (1968); Selby v. 
Kuhns, 345 Mass. 600, 607, 188 N.E.2d 861, 865-66 (1963). 
12 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1504, 1506, 328 N.E.2d 490,491. i 
13 To protect the insured charity and the victim in the event that the insurer sought 
to assert the defense despite the contract provision, it would seem advisable, in view of 
the current doubt as to the enforceability of third party beneficiar~ contracts in Mas-
sachusetts, see Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1071, 1079, 284 N.E.2d 
238, 244, to also enact a provision providing that the victim may ma1·ntain an action on 
the policy in his own name. Cf G.L. c. 175, § 11. 
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Alternatively, section 85K of chapter 231 of the General Laws could 
be amended so as to impose tort liability on charities up to $20,000 or 
the amount of liability insurance carried by the charity, whichever 
amount is greater. 14 There are, no doubt, many charitable institutions 
that, if given a choice, would prefer, through the purchase of ade-
quate liability insurance, to have the victims of their torts fully com-
pensated. The $20,000 limitation in the present legislation, however, 
protects primarily the self-insured charity and in effect prevents a 
charity from carrying insurance that would, at minimal expense to the 
charity, 15 allow it to compensate adequately the seriously injured vic-
tims of its torts. 
C. MoToR VEHICLES 
§1.5. Pain and Suffering: Proof of Medical Expenses. In Victum 
v. Martin, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the question 
whether proof of medical expenses by means of plaintiffs testimony 
and itemized medical bills, admitted in evidence as authorized in sec-
tion 79G of chapter 233 of the General Laws, is sufficient to establish 
that a plaintiffs medical expenses exceed the jurisdictional limit of 
five hundred dollars that section 6D of chapter 231 of the General 
Laws imposes as a prerequisite to recovery of damages for pain and 
suffering. Rejecting defendant's argument that section 6D imposes a 
new and higher degree of proof than is generally required to establish 
medical expenses, the Court held that plaintiffs testimony and bills 
submitted in accordance with section 79G are sufficient to surmount 
the jurisdictional hurdle of section 6D.2 The Court noted that a trial 
judge's discretion to require additional evidence in cases of suspect 
expenses would sufficiently protect the policies embodied in section 
6D.3 
Section 6D of chapter 231 of the General Laws precludes recovery 
for conscious pain and suffering where plaintiffs injury resulted from 
an automobile accident, unless either the reasonable and necessary 
medical expenses incurred in treating the injury exceed five hundred 
dollars, or one of five other conditions relating to the nature of the 
injury are satisfied. Section 6D was enacted as part of the reform of 
14 This amendment would not require jury knowledge of the existence or amount of 
liability insurance carried by a charity. The jury would merely determine liability and 
damages; the court thereafter would apply the formula. Cf Sorenson v. Sorenson, 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 3662, 3665, 339 N.E.2d 907, 909, where the court abrogated the doc-
trine of parental immunity for a tort action for negligence arising from an automobile 
accident to the extent of the parent's automobile liability insurance coverage. 
15 For the insured charity, the amount of premiums involved in raising its coverage 
from $20,000 to, for example, $200,000, is minimal. Insurance expense is primarily in 
the first $10,000 to $20,000 of coverage. 
§1.5. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1032, 1034, 326 N.E.2d 12, 14. 
2 /d. at 1039, 326 N.E.2d at 16. 
3 /d. at 1041, 326 N.E.2d at 17. 
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motor vehicle insurance legislation commonly known as the "no-fault" 
law. 4 Elimination of nuisance claims for pain and suffering from 
minor personal injuries was the purpose of section 6D's enactment; 
such elimination was essential to a plan designed in part to reduce lia-
bility insurance premiums.5 ! 
Section 79G of chapter 233 of the General Laws al~ows an itemized 
medical bill, sworn to by the physician, dentist, or the! agent of the in-
stitution rendering the medical services, to be used ip "an action for 
tort or contract" as evidence "of the necessary, fair, and reasonable 
charge for such services." Prior to a 1974 amendment I to section 79G, 6 
the word "necessary" was not in the statute, and the statute specifically 
limited its operation to tort actions for personal injury. 7 
The defendant in Victum contended that section 79G, even as 
amended, was not intended by the legislature to apply to satisfy sec-
tion 6D's requirement of proof that the necessary n(ledical expenses 
incurred in treating the injury exceed five hundred d~llars; only med-
ical testimony at the trial could satisfy that burden.8 ! The defendant 
argued that the fact that the charges were necessary, fair and reason-
able did not establish that the services were necessar)-1. 9 Although the 
Supreme Judicial Court said it had no opinion on th~ defendant's as-
sertions, it did imply that a plaintiff seeking recovery for pain and 
suffering in an automobile accident case may utilize the method pre-
scribed by section 79G to prove that the reasonable and necessary 
medical expenses incurred in treating his injury exceeded five 
hundred dollars, whether the injury occurred after the 1974 amend-
ment to section 79G or, as was the case in Victum, before the 
amendment. 10 
There is no doubt that the 1974 amendment11 to ~ection 79G was 
intended to have the section apply to proof of II1edical expenses 
under the "no-fault" provisions. The amendment w~s enacted in re-
sponse to a lower court decision that had disallowe its use in such 
situations on the basis that an action seeking medical expenses under 
the "no-fault" provisions sounded in contract rather than in tort. 12 
The added word "necessary" merely tracks the language of the "no-
fault" statute. A claim for pain and suffering, however, is not a "no-
fault" claim; it is a common law claim. It appears, therefore, that as 
regards legislative intent, the 1974 amendment to section 79G had no 
4 Acts of 1970, c. 670 (codified in G.L. c. 90, § 34A et seq.). i 
5 See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 28-29, 271 N.E.2d 592, 609-1!0 (1971). 
6 G.L. c. 233, § 79G, as amended (Supp. 1974). i 
7 For a discussion of Acts of 1974, c. 442, see Smith, Torts, 19i4 ANN. SuRv. MASS. 
LAW§ 6.5, at ll0-11. 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1038-39, 326 N.E.2d at 16. 
9 I d. 
10 See id. at 1039, 326 N.E.2d at 16. 
11 Acts of 1974, c. 442. 
12 Barnette v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., (Boston Mun. Ct., App. Div., June 25, 
1974), discussed in Smith, Torts, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 6.5, at 110-ll. 
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direct bearing on the issue before the Court in Victum. Section 79G, 
both before and after its amendment, had to apply to section 6D sim-
ply because an opposite conclusion would have brought about the ab-
surd result of a plaintiff in a personal injury action recovering a large 
amount of damages for past medical expenses on a jury finding that 
such expenses were necessary and reasonable but being barred from 
recovering for pain and suffering because of his failure to prove by 
competent medical testimony that his necessary and reasonable medi-
cal expenses exceeded five hundred dollars. 
The danger that the use of sworn itemized medical statements to 
satisfy the five hundred dollar limit of section 6D might frustrate the 
purpose of that section should be handled, not by a rule of general 
application requiring a stricter degree of proof under section 6D than 
is allowed generally to establish medical expenses, but, as the Victum 
opinion indicates, by the trial judge exercising his authority to require 
additional evidence, including in some instances, competent medical 
testimony in cases where abuse seems apparent. 13 
§1.6. Pain and Suffering: Non-Resident Drivers. In Cyr v. 
Farias, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court held that section 6D of chapter 
231 of the General Laws applies to a claim for pain and suffering 
brought by a non-resident automobile operator injured through the 
negligence of a Massachusetts operator. 
Section 6D of chapter 231 of the General Laws precludes recovery 
for conscious pain and suffering where plaintiffs injury resulted from 
an automobile accident unless either the reasonable and necessary 
medical expenses incurred in treating the injury exceed five hundred 
dollars, or one of five other conditions relating to the nature of the 
injury are satisfied. Section 6D was upheld by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in 1971 against constitutional attack, the Court emphasizing 
that the elimination of minor claims for pain and suffering through 
use of an objective standard was a necessary corollary to the 
legislature's attempt, by the Personal Injury Protection Statute (the 
"no-fault" law),2 to reduce motor vehicle tort litigation. 3 
In the 1974 decision of Chipman v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority, 4 the plaintiff was injured while boarding the defendant's bus 
as the result of the defendant's negligence. She was not covered by 
any of the "no-fault" provisions because neither she nor any member 
of her household owned a motor vehicle and the defendant public 
transportation authority was exempt from the no-fault provisions. 5 In 
13 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1032, 1040-41, 326 N.E.2d 12, 16-17. 
§1.6. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1508, 1511-12,327 N.E.2d 890,892. 
2 Acts of 1970, c. 670 (codified in G.L. c. 90, § 34A et seq.). 
3 Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 28-29, 271 N.E.2d 592, 609-10 (1971). 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1447, 316 N.E.2d 725, discussed in Smith, Torts, 1974 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW§ 6.9, at 119-21. 
5 Vehicles operated by the MBTA are relieved of the compulsory insurance require-
ments of chapter 90. G.L. c. 90, § 1A. 
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I 
her personal i~ury action, the plaintiff was allowed recovery for pain 
and suffering even though she did not fulfill any of the conditions of 
section 6D, the Court holding that since plaintiff had no recourse to 
"no-fault" benefits and since the defendant was exe~pt, section 6D 
did not apply to her claim for pain and suffering. 6 Anlticipating other 
cases arising where plaintiffs are not entitled to "notfault" benefits, 
the Court in Chipman stated that its decision was not ~eterminative of 
any other situation. 7 
The plaintiff in Cyr, relying on Chipman, argued that since, as a 
nonresident operator, he was not entitled to "no-fau)" benefits, sec-
tion 6D should have no application to his pain and uffering claim. 
The Court rejected this contention, holding that the d fendant in Cyr, 
unlike the defendant in Chipman, had borne the burden of compul-
sory insurance.8 Further, since the defendant in Chipman was self-
insured, application of the pain and suffering exemption of section 
6D would in no way further the legislative purpofe of reducing 
premiums. 9 , 
While Cyr dealt directly only with the situation of ~he nonresident 
operator, the distinctions that the Court drew between Chipman and 
Cyr lead to the conclusion that section 6D will apply in any claim for 
pain and suffering where the defendant is not exempt~from the com-
pulsory insurance requirements of chapter 90 of the G neral Laws, ir-
respective of whether the plaintiff, under the par icular circum-
stances, is entitled to "no-fault" benefits.10 I 
The "no-fault" provisions had two related purposes: the reduction 
of court congestion and a hoped-for reduction in automobile insur-
ance premiums. The Supreme Judicial Court in Chlpman and Cyr 
overemphasizes the latter. Since the defendant in Ch pman was self-
insured, the non-application of section 6D does not ffect the latter 
purpose. An opposite result in Cyr would affect, albeit minutely, the 
latter purpose, since recovery for pain and suffering would be cov-
ered by defendant's compulsory liability insurance. Obviously the 
former purpose is unaffected, irrespective of which r~sult is reached, 
since the plaintiff, not being covered by "no-fault" is pound to bring 
an action for his personal injury whether or not secqon 6D applies. 
The real issue therefore is whether the slight effect that an opposite 
6 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1452-53, 316 N.E.2d at 729. 
7 /d. at 1453-54, 316 N.E.2d at 729. 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1512, 327 N.E.2d at 892. 
9 Id. The Court in Cyr also rejected the plaintiffs contention that the application of § 
6D constituted an invidious discrimination against nonresidents. /d. at 1513-15, 327 
N.E.2d at 893. The Court pointed out that§ 6D also applies where 1 resident brings an 
action against a nonresident operator arising out of a Massachus tts accident. Id. at 
1514, 327 N.E.2d at 893. Thus, the nonresident obtains the benefits, as well as the bur-
dens, of § 6D. 
10 Thus, for example, a person who is precluded from recovering "no-fault" benefits 
because he is entitled to payments under G.L. c. 152, § 15 (workmen's compensation) is 
probably limited by th1 conditions set out in § 6D in his action against a negligent third 
party. 
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result in Cyr might have on insurance premiums warrants depriving 
the nonresident plaintiff of recovery for pain and suffering without 
his receiving the quid pro quo available to residents, namely, recovery 
up to $2000 irrespective of fault, a corresponding exemption from 
liability up to $2000, and the hoped-for reduction of premiums.U 
It might be noted that, in upholding the validity of the "no-fault" 
provisions, including section 6D, in Pinnick v. Cleary, 12 the Supreme 
Judicial Court, analogizing the situation to workmen's compensation 
legislation, examined whether the "no-fault" provisions provided a 
reasonable substitution for prior rights. 13 As regards pain and suffer-
ing, no such substitution is available to the nonresident operator. 
Principally because pain and suffering does not constitute an out-of-
pocket loss, it is highly unlikely that the distinction drawn between 
Chipman and Cyr has any unconstitutional infirmity; it merely seems 
unfair, and unnecessary to accomplish the legislative purposes in 
enacting the "no-fault" law. 
D. DEFAMATION 
§1.7. Libel: Application of Gertz Doctrine. In Stone v. Essex 
County Newspapers, Inc., 1 the Supreme Judicial Court reconsidered its 
197 4 decision in the same case2 in light of the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert A. Welch, Inc. 3 and, in remand-
ing the case for a new trial, announced a new standard for recovery 
of damages for defamation where the plaintiff is neither a public fig-
ure nor a public official. The Court in Stone held that such a plaintiff 
may recover damages for a defamatory falsehood upon proof of 
negligence4 and that such damages may not include punitive damages, 
but are limited to compensatory damages for actual injury only. 5 A 
plaintiff who is a public figure or public officer may likewise recover 
only compensatory damages, but must prove that the defendant pub-
lished the defamatory falsehood with actual malice-that is, knowl-
edge of its falsity or reckless disregard of its falsity; 6 moreover, the 
Court read Gertz as requiring that actual malice be established by clear 
and convincing evidence. 7 
11 Although it is true, as the Court in Cyr points out, see note 9, supra, that a negli-
gent nonresident defendant may benefit from section 6D's application in an action 
brought by a Massachusetts resident or a subrogating insurer, this benefit is minor 
when compared with the overall benefits that "no-fault" was intended to provide. 
12 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). 
13 /d. at 21-24,271 N.E. 2d at 605-07. 
§1.7. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1704, 330 N.E.2d 161. 
2 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 693, 311 N.E.2d 52. 
3 418 U.S. 323 (1974), discussed in Smith, Torts, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 6.10, at 
121-25. 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1705, 330 N.E.2d at 164. 
5 Id. at 1705-06, 330 N.E.2d at 164. 
6 Id. at 1705, 330 N.E.2d at 164. 
7 Id. at 1706, 330 N.E.2d at 164. 
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In the 1971 plurality decision of Rosenbloom v. Metrorfu!dia, Inc., 8 the 
United States Supreme Court discarded the "public figure" test for 
the application of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan91 rule and held 
that the First Amendment privilege applied where the defamatory 
matter involved an issue of public or general concern, ~irrespective of 
whether the person defamed was public or private. In the 1974 Stone 
decision, the Supreme Judicial Court applied Rosenbloom, granting the 
plaintiff a new trial since the trial judge had incorrectly instructed the 
jury that the constitutional limitations were not aptl>licable.10 The 
Court found that a public issue was involved where ithe defendant 
newspaper had incorrectly reported that the plaintiff was a defendant 
in a criminal trial for drug possession. Shortly after the%197 4 decision, 
the United States Supreme Court announced its de ision in Gertz. 
Gertz retained the New York Times standard for publi officials and 
public figures, but held that the states may establish a lesser standard, 
short of strict liability, where private persons are d~famed.U The 
United States Supreme Court also held, however, that ~here plaintiff 
relies on the lesser standard, damages may be recovered only for ac-
tual injury. 12 Although such damages were not necessarily limited to 
out-of-pocket damages, they did not include any presumed 
damagesP Following Gertz, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed to re-
hear the Stone case. 
The 197 5 Stone opinion established the following rules in Mas-
sachusetts defamation cases. First, the New York Time$ actual malice 
standard (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard fot truth) will be 
applied where the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, but a 
negligence standard will be applied where the defamel:l plaintiff is a 
private person. 14 I 
Second, to satisfy the burden of proof on the issue that defendant 
made the defamatory falsehood with knowledge of its falsity or with 
reckless disregard for its truth, the usual standard irl civil cases (a 
preponderance of the evidence) is not sufficient; the I plaintiffs evi-
8 403 u.s. 29, 43-44 (1971). 
9 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The Times ran a political advertisem~nt endorsing civil 
rights demonstrations by black students in Alabama and impliedly condemning the per-
formance of local law-enforcement officials. The plaintiff established in state court that 
certain misstatements in the advertisement referred to him and that they constituted 
libel per se. The Times was thus left with only the defense of truth, as peither good faith 
nor reasonable· care would protect the Times from liability under statf law. The United 
States Supreme Court held that a public official may not recover for defamation relat-
ing to his official conduct unless the defendant made the statement with "actual 
malice"-that is, knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for its t~uth or falsity. /d. 
10 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 693, 697-98, 311 N.E.2d 52, 56, disl;ussed in Cronin, 
Constitutional Law, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 10.1, at 187-93. I 
11 418 U.S. at 347. 
12 /d. at 348-50. 
13 /d. 
14 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1716-18, 330 N.E.2d at 168-69. 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1975 [1975], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1975/iss1/5
§1.7 TORTS 17 
dence must be clear and convincing.15 This standard applies not only 
to the jury instruction that must be given but also to the determina-
tion by the judge whether to submit the issue to the jury; 16 that is, 
"the judge must determine whether the jury would be warranted in 
concluding that malice was proved by clear and convincing 
evidence."17 The obvious danger of this approach is that the "clear 
and convincing" standard relates not only to the kind of evidence pre-
sented but also to its individual reliability. The judge, it would seem, 
in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, could not avoid choosing 
between conflicting evidence, and judging the credibility of the 
witnesses. 18 In fact, one federal court judge has taken the position 
that, in ruling on a defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the 
issue of knowledge of falsity or recklessness, the court should judge 
the credibility of witnesses and draw its own inferences from the 
evidence .19 
Third, punitive damages are not recoverable in any defamation ac-
tion on any state of proof, whether based on negligence or wilful 
conduct. 20 This approach is more strict than Gertz, which allows im-
position of punitive damages where plaintiff proves, under the New 
York Times standard, wilful or reckless defamation. 21 The disallowance 
of punitive damages in any defamation action was the law of Mas-
sachusetts even prior to Gertz. 22 
15 /d. at 1735,330 N.E.2d at 174-75. While this burden is not as onerous as the. 
standard in criminal cases (beyond a reasonable doubt), it is more onerous than the 
usual burden in a civil case. 
16 /d., 330 N.E.2d at 175. 
17 /d. In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Quirico takes the position that it 
was not the intent of the United States Supreme Court in using the language "clear and 
convincing" to impose a different burden of proof on this issue than on other issues in 
a civil case: "I, however, view this language as little more than confusing 
rhetoric-words which have been given no content by the United States Supreme 
Court." /d. at 1738-40, 330 N.E.2d at 176 (dissenting and concurring opinion). 
18 In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Quirico states: 
Despite the court's disclaimer of an intention to do so, it appears inevitable 
that, by reason of the statement that the trial judge must make a preliminary 
determination whether the jury could find the evidence on the malice issue 
clear and convincing, the judge must to some degree evaluate the weight and 
credibility of possibly conflicting and ambiguous evidence and draw his own 
inferences therefrom. 
/d. at 1746-47, 330 N.E.2d at 178-79. 
19 Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., concurring), 
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970). See also Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024 
(5th Cir. 1975), granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict where plaintiff failed to 
establish malice by dear and convincing evidence, defined as "more than a preponder-
ance." /d. at 1026. Other courts have held that a plaintiff is entitled to go to the jury on 
the issue of actual malice where he has made a showing of facts from which an infer-
ence of malice may be drawn. Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (D.D.C. 1975); 
Local 1581, A.F.T. v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1974). 
20 Stone, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1719,330 N.E.2d at 169. 
21 418 U.S. at 349. 
22 Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., 198 Mass. 538, 542, 544, N.E. 1018, 1019, 1020 
(1908). 
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Fourth, compensatory damages are limited to actual injury, which 
includes recovery for mental suffering, harm to reputation, and any 
specific harm alleged to have resulted from the defamation.23 The 
Court, in setting forth this rule, stated that it constitutes a reaffirma-
tion of controlling principles in the Commonwealt~24 Under prior 
Massachusetts law, actual injury has included the men al suffering and 
loss of reputation assumed to flow from slander per se 5 and libel.26 In 
Gertz, however, the Court held that where a plaintiff ~stablishes liabil-
ity on a standard less demanding than New York Times, compensatory 
damages could not be had for presumed damages, but only for "ac-
tual injury."27 Therefore, although the Supreme Judicial Court asserts 
that in limiting damages to actual injury, it is reaffirming controlling 
principles of Massachusetts law, in fact the law of the Commonwealth 
has been changed at least to this extent by Gertz. The Supreme Judical 
Court did not indicate whether a plaintiff who does meet the New 
York Times standard may recover presumed damage , as Gertz would 
allow. Since presumed damages have been the rule i Massachusetts, 
and since the Court has indicated that it wishes o reaffirm past 
precedent, it may be expected that the Court will foll w the prior rule 
except to the extent that Gertz precludes it from doin so. 
One critical question left unanswered by both G rtz and Stone is 
whether a plaintiff may recover at least nominal damages for loss of 
reputation in the case of slander per se or libel, without the necessity 
of producing witnesses who will testify that they held or now hold the 
plaintiff in les.s esteem because of the defamatory statement. At least 
one justiCe on the United States Supreme Court interprets the Gertz 
requirement of "'competent" proof of actual injury, t gether with the 
proof-of-fault requirement, as virtually precluding th opportunity for 
most persons to vindicate their reputations "by secu ing a judgment 
for nominal damages, the practical effect of such j dgment being a 
judicial declaration that the publication was indeed fa se."28 
If failure to plead or prove actual damages will res lt in dismissal of 
a plaintiffs case, then limiting compensatory damages to actual injury 
may place an unwarranted impediment in the way of plaintiffs who 
are more concerned with vindicating their reputation than with recov-
ering money damages. While the nonmalicious defamer of private 
persons deserves constitutional protection against the recovery of ex-
cessive damages, such protection does not require ttt one defamed 
be denied the opportunity to restore his reputatio by recovery of 
nominal damages simply because no witness testifies at he held such 
person in lower esteem because of the defamation. ertainly experi-
23 Stone, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1719-20,330 N.E.2d at 169. 
24 I d. 
25 Lynch v. Lyons, 303 Mass. 116, 118-20,20 N.E.2d 953,955 (1939). 
28 Sharratt v. Housing Innovations, Inc., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 581, 310 N.E.2d 
343, 347 (1974). 
27 418 U.S. at 350. 
28 /d. at 376 (White, J ., dissenting). 
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ence demonstrates "that some publications are so inherently capable 
of injury, and actual i~ury so difficult to prove,"29 that vindication 
through a judgment for at least nominal damages should be allowed 
without the production of such witnesses. 3° Furthermore, in a case in 
which only nominal damages are sought, it is unnecessary to impose 
even a negligence standard. A sensible compromise would allow plain-
tiff to recover nominal damages for loss of reputation on a strict liabil-
ity standard and allow recovery of damages for such items as mental 
suffering on a state-established standard short of strict liability. 
In discussing the application of the new rules, the Court in Stone 
made the following observations. First, as with the case of privilege 
generally, the determination of whether plaintiff is a public figure or 
public official is a question of law.31 If the facts bearing on plaintiffs 
status are in dispute, the judge will submit the issue to the jury after 
instructions "on the applicable law and on what facts must be found 
to constitute the plaintiff a public official or a public figure." 32 
Second, the mere fact that the plaintiff is a government employee is 
not determinative of whether he is a public official, for government 
employees in the lower ranks are not public officials for purposes of 
the rule. "[T]he designation of public official applies at least to gov-
ernment employees who have, or publicly appear to have, substantial 
responsibilities for control of public affairs."33 "The employee's posi-
tion must be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of 
the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion 
occasioned by the particular charges in controversy."34 
Finally, the standard for determining whether defendant or his ser-
vant acted recklessly is subjective. That information was available that 
would cause a reasonably prudent person to entertain serious doubts 
is not sufficient; to find recklessness, the jury must find that such 
doubts were in fact entertained by the defendant or his servant. 35 Ob-
viously, the jury may reach this conclusion on the basis of inference 
drawn from objective evidence, since rarely would the defendant 
admit having had serious unresolved doubts. 36 
29 !d. 
30 See Smith, Torts, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 6.10, at 124. 
31 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1722, 330 N.E.2d at 170. 
32 /d. at 1723, 330 N .E.2d at 170-71. 
33 /d. at 1724, 330 N.E.2d at 171. 
34 !d. at 1725, 330 N.E.2d at 171, quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86-87 n.l3 
(1966). 
35 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1731, 330 N .E.2d at 173. This accords with the view of the 
United States Supreme Court. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 
(1968). 
36 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1731, 330 N.E.2d at 173. On the facts of Stone, the Court 
held that a jury could find recklessness on the subjective standard. Defendant's news 
editor allowed the story to be printed despite serious doubts as to its accuracy. He knew 
plaintiff to be an "excellent citizen" and admitted that he was surprised by the story. He 
knew the reporter who submitted the story was inexperienced. Further, a full day was 
available to the editor to check the story prior to its publication. !d. at 1734-35, 330 
N .E.2d at 174. 
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Two critical issues are unresolved by either Gertz orl Stone. First, may 
a public figure recover on a standard less than mali~e if the defama-
tory statement concerns a matter that is purely priv te? Neither New 
York Times, nor Rosenbloom applied to purely priv te matters. The 
Supreme Judicial Court in Stone leaves open the poss bility of such re-
covery. In a footnote, 37 the Court observed that t e 1975 tentative 
draft of the Restatement of Torts would allow recove by a public of-
ficial or public figure on a negligence standard wher the defamation 
relates to a private matter.38 
The second unresolved issue is whether the stan ards set out in 
Gertz apply only to the media (freedom of press), or o any defendant 
in a defamation case (freedom of speech). Neither New York Times, 
Rosenbloom, nor Gertz answers this question. In a 197 5 federal decision, 
Davis v. Schuchat, 39 however, the court of appeals eld that private 
persons and the media are equally protected by th New York Times 
standard. 40 The court observed that the First A endment speaks 
equally of freedom of speech and of the press and reasoned that if 
the press were given more protection than private speech, persons 
would be encouraged to rush allegations into wide p blication. 41 
E. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
§1.8. Medical Malpractice: Preliminary Dete nation of Suffi-
ciency of Evidence. In response to the critical pro lem of the rising 
cost of medical malpractice insurance, the Massach setts Legislature 
enacted chapter 362 of the Acts of 1975. The dec ared purpose of 
chapter 3621 is "to guarantee the continued avail bility of medical 
malpractice insurance . . . ."2 Section 5 of chapter 623 imposes re-
stramts on the maintenance of medical malpractice a tions; these pro-
visions are designed to reduce the costs of litigation to the insurer by 
37 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1718 n.7, 330 N.E.2d at 169 n.7. 
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 580B, (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1975), which was 
formulated after the Gertz. case came down, reads as follows: "One who publishes a false 
and defamatory communication concerning a private person, or ~ncerning a public offi-
cial or a public figure in relation to a private matter, is subject to liabi ity, if, but only if, he 
(a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames the oth r, (b) acts in reckless 
disregard of these matters, or (c) acts negligently in failing to scertain them." (em-
phasis supplied). ' 
38 510 F.2d 731, (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
40 I d. at 734 n.3. i 
41 /d. Contra, Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d ~26, 934-35, 119 Cal. 
Rptr: 82, 87 (1975). Roemer involved a nonmedia defendant and a purely commercial 
communication (a mercantile agency that submitted false in esugative reports to 
plaintiff's prospective employers). 
§1.8. 1 Chapter 362 was declared an emergency measure, and me of its provisions 
took effect immediately. Acts of 1975 c. 362, § 13. 
2 Emergency. preamble, Acts of 1975, c. 362. 
3 G.L. c. 231, § 60B-E, amending G.L. c. 231. 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1975 [1975], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1975/iss1/5
§1.8 TORTS 21 
discouraging the bringing of frivolous actions. The provisions apply to 
actions against providers of health care and not merely physicians.4 
Section 5 of chapter 362 provides that every malpractice action 
against a provider of health care shall initially be heard by a tribunal 
consisting of a justice of the superior court, a physician respresenting 
the field of medicine in which the alleged injury occurred,5 and a 
Massachusetts attorney.6 At the hearing, the plaintiff shall present an 
offer of proof and the tribunal shall determine if the evidence pre-
sented, if properly substantiated, is sufficient to raise a legitimate 
question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry. 
The hearing shall be held within fifteen days after the defendant's 
answer has been filed. 7 The tribunal has the power to summon or 
subpoena individuals or records in order to substantiate or clarify any 
evidence which has been presented before it. 8 
If a finding is made for the defendant, the plaintiff may pursue the 
claim through the courts only upon filing bond in the amount of two 
thousand dollars with the clerk of the appropriate court, payable to 
the defendant for costs assessed, including witness's and expert's fees 
and attorney's fees, if the plaintiff does not prevail in the final 
judgment.9 The bond, which may be increased by the superior court 
justice (or reduced in the case of an indigent plaintiff), must be 
posted within thirty days of the tribunal's finding; otherwise the ac-
tion shall be dismissed. 10 
The statute also provides that the complaint in a medical malprac-
tice case shall not contain an ad damnum.U 
This statute is ill conceived. It is the classic case of swatting a fly 
with a sledge hammer. Rather than wasting time and money with the 
tribunal approach, the statute should merely require a pre-trial 
4 Acts of 1975, c. 362, § 5. A provider of health care shall mean: 
I d. 
a person, corporation, facility or institution licensed by the commonwealth to 
provide health care or professional services as a physician, hospital, clinic or 
nursing home, dentist, registered or licensed nurse, optometrist, podiatrist, 
chiropractor, physical therapist or psychologist, or an officer, employee or 
agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his employment. 
• The physician shall be selected by the superior court justice from a list submitted 
by the Massachusetts Medical Society. The list shall consist only of physicians who prac-
tice medicine outside the county where the defendant practices or resides or if the de-
fendant is a medical institution or facility, outside the county where such institution or 
facility is located. Where the defendant is a person who is not a physician, the 
physician's position on the tribunal shall be replaced by a representative of that field of 
medicine in which the alleged malpractice occurred. Id. 
6 The attorney shall be selected from a list submitted by the Massachusetts Bar As-
sociation. !d. 
7 Id. 
8 Jd. 
9 I d. 
•o !d. 
II fd. 
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hearing12 in all medical malpractice cases and authorize the trial judge 
to require the posting of the bond where plaintiff is uncooperative at 
the hearing or where, based upon the hearing, the trial judge con-
cludes that plaintiffs claim lacks substance. If, due t~ the expert na-
ture of an issue in the claim, expert assistance is ne1eded, the judge 
may require the parties to file affidavits of experts iq the field to as-
sist the judge in determining whether experts agree! or disagree on 
that issue. The statute should also provide that uponithe motion of a 
party, with appropriate time for preparation, the hea ing may be con-
verted into the hearing on a motion for summary jud ment. 13 
F. INTEREST ON DAMAGES 
§1.9. Interest on Damages. In 1974, the Legislature changed the 
interest rate on damages from 6% to 8%. 1 The amendment did not 
indicate whether the increase applied to pending acti~ms.2 In Porter v. 
Clerk of the Superior Court, 3 the Supreme Judicial Cot1rt held that the 
8% figure did apply to pending actions, but only frpm the effective 
date of the amendment; interest should be calculated! at 6% from the 
date of the commencement of the action up to Aug~st 14, 1974 and 
thereafter at 8%.4 , 
The result in Porter is correct. Interest is meant as compensation for 
delay.5 A fully retroactive application of the amendment would re-
quire defendants to pay the 8% rate for periods when 6% was ap-
propriate, while a purely prospective application would have put a 
premium on delaying commencement of an action until the 
amendment's effective date. 
STUDENT CoMMENT 
g 1.10. Wrongful Death: Mone v. Greyhound Line~, lnc. 1 Plaintiff, 
Michael E. Mone, brought an action as administrato!r against defen-
dant, Greyhound Lines, Inc., for the wrongful death 1of his decedent, 
Dennis Brelsford, Jr., a viable2 eight and one-half month fetus, 3 pur-
12 Mass. R. Civ. P. 16 authorizes pre-trial conferences. 
13 Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 sets out the procedures for the motion for summary judgment. 
§ 1.9. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 224, § I. I 
2 For a discussion of Acts of 1974, c. 224, §1, see Smith, Torts, 1~74 ANN. SuRv. MASS. 
LAW§ 6.4, at 110. ! 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1959,330 N.E.2d 206. ! 
4 /d. at 1963, 330 N.E.2d at 208-09. I 
5 Murphy's Case, 352 Mass. 233, 234-35, 224 N.E.2d 462, 464 ~1967); Parks v. Bos-
ton, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 198, 208 (1834). 
§l.IO. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2326, 331 N.E.2d 916. 
2 The Supreme Judicial Court has defined a "viable child" as "a fetus so far formed 
and <;leveloped that if then born it would be capable of living." Keyes v. Constr. Serv., 
Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 637, 165 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1960). Viability is generally considered 
to be reached 24-28 weeks after conception. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973); 
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955). I 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2326-27, 331 N.E.2d at 916-17. I 20
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suant to section 2 of chapter 229 of the General Laws. The fetus was 
found dead in its mother's abdominal cavity during emergency 
surgery following a collision between the automobile in which the 
mother was riding and a Greyhound bus.4 The mother died shortly 
after the operation. 5 
The superior court dismissed the action,6 relying upon the 1972 
decision of Leccese v. McDonough, 7 which denied a right of action for 
the wrongful death of a fetus that, although viable at the time of in-
jury, was not born alive. 8 The Supreme Judicial Court, overruling 
Leccese, reversed the superior court's decision and HELD: an eight 
and one-half month unborn viable fetus is a person for purposes 
of the Massachusetts wrongful death statute9 and the administrator of 
its estate has a right of action for its wrongful death. 10 Three justices 
dissented. 11 
Mane thus altered Massachusetts law to afford a right of action for 
negligent conduct causing the stillbirth of a viable fetus. 12 The m~or­
ity of jurisdictions that have considered the issue employ the viability 
test to determine the availability of fetal wrongful death actions. 13 
This body of precedent was one factor that the Court mentioned to 
support its rejection of the live birth requirement. 14 In addition, the 
Court reasoned that legislative and judicial treatment of fetal wrong-
ful death actions in Massachusetts did not preclude judicial alteration 
of the cause of action. 15 Moreover, use of appropriate procedural 
rules could overcome the danger of speculation and difficulty of ad-
ministration of a viability test. 16 Therefore, the Court reinterpreted 
the Massachusetts wrongful death statute to include a "viable fetus" 
within the definition of "person."17 
This note will first review the historical evolution of Massachusetts 
4 /d. at 2327,331 N.E.2d at 917. 
5 /d. at 2328, 331 N.E.2d at 917. 
6 /d. at2327, 331 N.E.2d at 916-17. 
7 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 191, 279 N.E.2d 339. 
8 /d. at 193, 279 N .E.2d at 341. 
9 Mone was decided under a former version of the Massachusetts wrongful death stat-
ute, G.L. c. 229, § 2, as amended through Acts of 1971, c. 801, § 1, which read: "A per-
son who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person in the exercise of due care 
... shall be liable in damages in the sum of not less than five thousand, nor more than 
one hundred thousand dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree of his culpa-
bility .... " Since the Court in Mone did not limit its analysis to the former version of 
the wrongful death statute which was punitive in nature, the holding should equally 
cover actions arising under the 1973 amended version of the statute which is compen-
satory in nature. G.L. c. 229, § 2 (originally enacted as Acts of 1973, c. 699, § 1). 
10 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2335-36, 331 N.E.2d at 920. 
11 /d. at 2337-45, 331 N.E.2d at 920-23. 
12 /d. at 2335-36, 331 N .E.2d at 920. 
13 Jurisconsultus, 7 HousT. L. REv. 449, 459 (1970). 
14 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2330, 331 N.E.2d at 918. 
15 /d. at 2331-32, 331 N.E.2d at 918-19. See notes 43-62 infra. 
16 /d. at 2332-34, 331 N.E.2d at 919. 
17 /d. at 2335-36, 331 N.E.2d at 920, 
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law on fetal deaths. The majority and minority opinions in Mone will 
be analyzed and the effect of the decision on Massachietts law will be 
evaluated. The different views expressed by legal co mentators and 
courts on the criteria to be applied to fetal wrongful eath actions, as 
well as the rationales advanced in support of the various criteria, will 
then be considered, and the argument will be advanced that although 
"viability" is . a more satisfactory test than "live birthf" it is open to 
strong criticism. A potential solution· through ex pans· on of the dam-
ages recoverable in the common law action for miscar iage will be of-
fered. In conclusion, it will be submitted that the Massachusetts courts 
should abolish all restrictions on the right to bring an action for the 
wrongful death of a fetus or, in the alternative, should allow compen-
sa~ion ~or parental loss from the death of any fetus ip the action for 
mtscarnage. ! 
Three separate causes of action arising from negligbnt infliction of 
injury to a pregnant woman have been involved in the evolution of 
the Court's position on fetal death: the mother's action for miscar-
riage, the child's action for prenatal injuries, and the ~arents' 18 action 
for wrongful death. Each action has distinct element and proof re-
quirements. A prenatal injury action may be brough by a child for 
actionable injury to him while in utero. 19 Live birth: is required to 
maintain the suit, since recovery is for the benefit of the child. 20 A 
prenatal injury award is compensatory, similar to any other recovery 
by a live person for harm inflicted by a tortfeasor. I 
Unlike recoverable damages in a prenatal injury adion, recovery in 
a wrongful death action is only for the benefit of dertain statutory 
beneficiaries. 21 There is a split of authority as to whether live birth is 
required for maintenance of the action. This is predominantly a mat-
ter of statutory construction. The majority o. f jurisd~· tions that have 
considered this action now allow recovery for the d ath of a viable 
fetus in utero. 22 Some jurisdictions, however, retain th requirement of 
live birth. 23 No jurisdiction denies a right of action for the death due 
to prenatal injuries of a child born alive. 24 Even though independent of 
each other, the Massachusetts Court has occasionally treated the pre-
natal injury and wrongful death actions as interchangfjable where fetal 
death resulted from the prenatal injury. Thus, the !history of Mas-
sachusetts law on fetal death includes both causes of a¢tion. 
The third cause of action, a suit by the mother for miscarriage, af-
fords recovery exclusively for the mother's own injuries, without com-
I 
18 The parents can bring an action as .statutory beneficiaries. See q.L. c. 229, § 2. 
19 Keyes v. Constr. Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633,636-37, 165 N.E.2dl912, 914-15 (1960). 
20 /d. at 636, 165 N .E.2d at 915. 
21 E.g., G.L. c. 229, §§ 1, 2. 
22 Jurisconsultus, 7 HousT. L. REv. 449, 459 (1970). 
23 !d. at 453. 
24 !d. at 459. 
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pensation for death of the fetus. 25 Age of the fetus and live birth are 
irrelevant to the action, and no compensation is included for the 
father's loss. 26 
The wrongful death action, unlike the other two actions, is statutory 
in origin.27 In 1884, the Court, in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of 
Northampton 28 (the earliest and most frequently cited American case 
dealing with fetal death), construed an early, limited version of the 
wrongful death statute29 to exclude a cause of action for the death of 
a four- to five-month-old fetus who died a few moments after its 
premature birth. The mother had fallen on a defective highway and 
miscarried immediately. In denying recovery for the death, the Court 
rejected the rationales advanced by the plaintiff for maintenance of 
either a prenatal injury or wrongful death action. The Court cited the 
lack of precedent to support an action by a live child for prenatal 
injuries.30 In addition, the Court held that the child, although born 
alive, did not have a separate existence at the time of injury, and so 
was not a "person" within the meaning of the wrongful death 
statute.31 Thus, on the theory that an unborn child is part of its 
mother, the Court held that damages were recoverable only for the 
mother's personal injuries.32 
At common law, the mother could maintain an action for personal 
injury to her not causing her death, regardless of the cause of the 
injury.33 If the injury resulted in her death, however, no action could 
be maintained. 34 Responding to this anomalous situation of liability 
for infliction of nonfatal injury and nonliability for injury causing 
death, except in the narrow circumstances defined in Dietrich, 35 the 
Massachusetts legislature in 1898 enacted its first general wrongful 
death statute. This quasi-criminal statute was applicable to negligently 
caused death, and used a culpability standard as the measure of re-
coverable damages.36 The punitive model controlled in Massachusetts 
25 Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1964); Occhipinti v. 
Rheem Mfg. Co., 252 Miss. 172, 181, 172 So.2d 186, 190 (1965). 
26 Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1964). 
27 Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (I Cush.) 475, 478 (1848). Without mention of 
supporting reasons, the Court denied a common law action for wrongful death on the 
authority of the English lower court decision in Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 
(K.B. 1808). 
28 138 Mass. 14 (1884). 
29 Pub. St. c. 52,§ 17 (Acts of 1881, c. 199, §§ 4, 5). This statute allowed the executor 
to maintain a cause of action against a town for his decedent's death caused by a defec-
tive highway. 
3o 138 Mass. at 15-16. 
31 /d. at 17. 
32 /d. 
33 An action for trespass or trespass on the case could be maintained. W. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 7, at 28-29 (4th ed. 1971). 
34 Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (I Cush.) 475, 478 (1848). 
35 See note 29 supra. 
36 Acts of 1898, c. 565. 
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I 
until 1973, when significant amendments altered the ~tatute to allow 
recovery of compensatory damages.37 i 
Until 1960, the Massachusetts Court repeatedly refu~ed to recognize 
a cause of action for prenatal injury or fetal wrongful death.38 How-
ever, a major alteration in the prenatal injury actiorlt had occurred 
earlier in many jurisdictions. In 1946, the United Stat s District Court 
for the District of Columbia granted recovery to a r ve child for its 
prenatal injuries in Bonbrest v. Kotz. 39 Thereafter, he majority of 
jurisdictions reversed their prior stances and follow d the Bonbrest 
decision. 4° Courts could readily accept that justice de anded sustain-
ing a child's action for prenatal injuries when the chil was forced to 
live with the effects of a tortfeasor's negligenceY Acctptance of fetal 
wrongful death actions was more difficult to ratiorplize, however, 
since recovery does not accrue to the benefit of a harmed child.42 
In 1960, the Court in Keyes v. Construction Service, i1 c. 43 finally de-
vitalized the Dietrich doctrine as it pertained to prenat 1 injury actions. 
The Court held that a viable fetus becomes a human . eing upon live 
birth and has a right of action for prenatal injuries Ofcurring during 
the viability stage.44 Although this was a conservative holding in light 
of the positions of other jurisdictions, 45 it effected a ~ajor alteration 
in Massachusetts law. A viable fetus became an entity tith legally pro-
tected interests. 1 
Three reasons were advanced in Keyes for allowing he child's right 
of action: (1) "natural justice" requires protection of child's right to 
be born without defects caused by the negligence of a tortfeasor; (2) a 
wrong should be redressed; and (3) an unborn child s regarded as a 
legal entity in property and criminal law. 46 In dicta, the Court ob-
37 Acts of 1973, c. 699, § 1, amending G.L. c. 229, § 2. The 1973 mendments revised 
the statute to reflect a compensatory model. This model is used by the majority of 
jurisdictions in their wrongful death statutes; however, "[t]he lang age of the statutes 
varies, and no general rule can be stated for their construction." RES ATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS§ 869, at 178 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). 
38 E.g., Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 179, 181, 1 7 N.E.2d 307,308 
(1952); Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 463, 95 N.E.2d 206, 207 (1 50). 
39 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946). ~, 
40 See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 04, 93 S.E.2d 727 
(1956); Kelly v. Gregory, 2.82 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 ( 953); Puhl v. Mil-
waukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 W1s. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 162 (1959). i 
41 E.g., Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 141-42. L 
42 See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478,483, 248 N.E.2d F01, 903 (1969). 
43 340 Mass. 633, 165 N .E.2d 912 (1960). 1 
44 /d. at 636-37, 165 N.E.2d at 915. 
45 When faced with the issue, most courts have held that a child rn live may sustain 
an action for prenatal injury occurring at any stage of pregnancy. H rnbuckle v. Planta-
tion Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1956); Ben ett v. Hymers, 101 
N.H. 483, 486, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 pp .. Div .. 5.42, 545, 
125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (1953); see Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. o., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 
356-57, 99 N.W.2d 162, 170-71 (1959) (dictum); W. PROSSER, HAND OOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 55, at 337 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOR S § 869, at 174-82 
(Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). 
46 340 Mass. at 635, 165 N.E.2d at 914. 
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served that no recovery would have been granted if live birth had not 
occurred.47 
In 1967, the Court in Torig;ian v. Watertown News Co., 48 a wrongful 
death action, extended the Keyes decision on prenatal injuries. The 
Court in Torig;ian allowed a wrongful death action for a five- to six-
month-old fetus that died two and one-half hours after birth. Two 
months prior to birth, the mother was involved in an automobile acci-
dent that was subsequently found to be the cause of her fetus's pre-
mature birth and death. The Court rejected its previous grounds for 
denying recovery49 and held that a live-born fetus was a person under 
the wrongful death statute, reasoning that there was then adequate 
precedent for extending the cause of action as well as ample pro-
cedural safeguards against speculative and fraudulent claims.50 
Since the infant in Torig;ian happened to be born alive, the Court 
was not confronted with the issue of whether live birth was required 
for recovery. Nor did the Court directly deal with the question, al-
though it did favorably cite Keyes, 51 in which the Court would have 
denied an action for prenatal injuries in the case of a stillborn fetus. 52 
The stage of fetal development at death was also deemed irrelevant 
since live birth had occurred.53 Thus, the Court was able to avoid the 
difficult medical issue of whether the five- to six-month-old fetus was 
viable at the time of death. 
The United States District Court for Massachusetts foreshadowed 
the next development in Massachusetts law. In 1969, the court, in 
Henry v. Jones, 54 interpreted the holdings of Keyes and Torig;ian to re-
quire live birth for maintenance of a wrongful death action for a via-
ble fetus. 55 Although the Supreme Judicial Court in Torig;ian had not 
expressly addressed the live birth requirement, the federal district 
court reasoned, from the facts of Torig;ian, that live birth was indeed a 
prerequisite to recovery for wrongful death. 56 The court did not find 
it relevant that the fetus in Henry was viable at its death. 
Three years later, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Leccese v. 
McDonough, 57 sustained this interpretation, holding that a stillborn vi-
able fetus was not a "person" within the meaning of the Massachusetts 
wrongful death statute.58 In this action, plaintiffs alleged that negli-
gent treatment by the doctor caused the stillbirth of a viable seven-
47 Id. at 637, 165 N.E.2d at 915. 
48 352 Mass. 446, 449, 225 N .E.2d 926, 927 (1967). 
49 See Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17. 
50 352 Mass. at 448-49, 225 N.E.2d at 927. 
51 Id. at 447-48, 225 N.E.2d at 927. 
52 340 Mass. at 637, 165 N.E.2d at 915. 
53 352 Mass. at 448-49, 225 N.E.2d at 927. 
54 306 F. Supp. 726 (D. Mass. 1969). 
55 I d. at 727. 
56 I d. 
57 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 191, 279 N.E.2d 339. 
58 Id. at 193, 279 N.E.2d at 341. 
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month-old fetus. 59 The Court presented three reasons for requmng 
live birth. First, the requirement creates a "sensible and easily ad-
ministered rule."60 Second, a fetus born alive is theoretically capable 
of surviving and enduring the consequences of its prenatal injury. 61 
Finally, any alteration in the test applied to the statu~e is more prop-
erly made by the legislature. 62 
These reasons were subsequently rejected in Mon 63 wherein the 
Court adopted the viability test and sustained the pi intiffs right to 
bring an action for the wrongful death of a viable ~ tus en ventre sa 
mere. The Court began by observing that the majorit of jurisdictions 
no longer use the "live birth" test, but look instead t viability as the 
determinative factor for protection under their wrongful death 
statutes.64 The Court then reasoned that since the legislature did not 
indicate the intended meaning of "person," judicial interpretation of 
the term is appropriate.65 By joinder or consolidation of actions and 
precise jury instructions, a court could control the daqgers of specula-
tive damage awards and double recoveries in acti~ns based on a 
stillbirth.66 Moreover, stillbirth after viability would~! not render the 
measure of damages any less capable of precise calc lation than live 
birth followed soon by death.67 The Court thus con luded that it is 
unreasonable and ur~ust to condition a right of acti n for wrongful 
death on live birth. 68 
The dissenting judges agreed that the live birth criterion should be 
rejected, but would also have rejected the viability test69 because viabil-
ity is an amorphous concept that depends on many individual mater-
nal factors. 70 The dissenters' rejection of both the live birth and viabil-
ity tests suggests that thev would allow a cause of 1action for fetal 
death in any stage of pregnancy. 71 
I 
59 Id. at 191, 279 N.E.2d at 340. The Court did not label the suitl as either a prenatal 
injury or wrongful death action. . ! 
60 I d. at 193, 279 N .E.2d at 341. · 
6lfd. 
62 Id. at 193-94, 279 N.E.2d at 341. 
63 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2329, 331 N.E.2d at 917. 
64 /d. at 2330,331 N.E.2d at 91'8. 
65 Id. at 2332, 2334 n.8, 331 N.E.2d at 919, 919 n.8. 
66 Id. at 2333, 331 N.E.2d at 919. Double recovery occurs when ~e plaintiff receives 
compensation for the same injuries in different actions. For exa pie, stillbirth of a 
fetus may give rise to actions for personal injury, miscarriage, and tal wrongful death. 
Thus, the mother potentially could receive three awards for the sa e injuries. Consoli-
dation of these actions in a single suit would prevent double rec very since the jury 
would be instructed to consider the injuries sustained and make a sfngle award of dam-
~L : 
67 Id. at 2334, 331 N.E.2d at 919. I 
68 Id., 331 N.E.2d at 920. 
69 Id. at 2337, 2344-45, 331 N.E.2d at 920, 923. 
70 Id. at 2345, 331 N.E.2d at 923. 
71 The dissenters rejected the live birth test ("we should not follow the Leccese case"), 
id. at 2343, 331 N.E.2d at 922, and also rejected the viability test ("There is of course 
no virtue in 'viable' .... It is ... a very unsatisfactory test."), id. at 2344-45, 331 N.E.2d 
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As a result of Mone, the present law in Massachusetts allows a right 
of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn viable fetus. 72 A 
number of issues regarding fetal wrongful death actions remain unre-
solved, however. One important question is whether Mone replaces the 
live birth test with the viability test, or whether it merely extends the 
wrongful death action to the viability stages of pregnancy, with live 
birth still raising a conclusive presumption of existence as a person 
under the statute. If the former, then an· action based on the facts of 
Torigian may now fail even though the fetus was born alive. In 
Torigian, th.e fetus was nonviable at the time of injury and the Court 
did not ascertain whether it was viable at the time of birth. If the 
latter-viability and live birth both support a fetal wrongful death ac-
tion but neither depends upon the other-then even if the fetus in 
Torigian was nonviable at birth, the holdings in Torir;it!n and Mone can 
be reconciled, because both the live birth of a nonVIable fetus and the 
stillbirth of a viable fetus would sustain a wrongful death action. 
A second issue left unresolved by Mone is whether an action may be 
maintained for the wrongful death of a viable fetus who died in the 
womb as a result of injuries inflicted while nonviable. It is submitted 
that a right of action would probably exist for this situation under the 
Massachusetts wron~ful death statute. In Mone, the Court construed 
the word "person" m the wrongful death statute to include a fetus 
that is viable at rkath; time of injury would thus appear unimportant. 73 
In addition, justice would seem to require such a result since the ef-
fect of the tortfeasor's negligence-death of a viable fetus-is the 
same regardless of when the injury is inflicted. 
at 923. However, they contended that the Court should depart from the live birth 
criterion of Leccese only for cases arising on or after January 1, 1974, the effective date 
of the compensatory version of the wrongful death statute. Id. at 2337, 2343, 331 
N.E.2d at 920, 922. The Court summarily dismissed this retroactivity argument by 
commenting that since the statute is of a civil nature, there is no valid objection to re-
troactive overruling. ld. at 2329 n.4, 331 N.E.2d at 917-18 n.4. It can also be argued, 
contrary to the minority's position, that the fact that the legislature gave the compen-
satory wrongful death statute prospective application should have no bearing on the 
Court's action in Mane. The Court was not applying the compensatory wrongful death 
statute retroactively. The only issue presented and resolved was whether "person," as 
used in the former wrongful death statute, includes a viable fetus. 
71 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2335-36, 331 N.E.2d at 920. 
73 If the action is based on willful, wanton, or reckless acts, a second statutory re-
quirement must be met to maintain a wrongful death action. That requirement is the 
ability of the deceased to recover damages for injuries if death had not resulted. G.L. c. 
229, § 2. The fetal wrongful death action 'would meet this prerequisite, since most 
courts and legal commentators recognize the separate existence of a fetus at the time of 
injury and thus hold that a cause of action for prenatal injuries arises when the injury is 
inflicted. E.g., State v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 183, 198 A.2d 71, 73 (1964); see Noonan, 
Constitutionality of the Regulation of Abortion, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 51, 55 (1969); Recent De-
velopments, 70 MICH. L. REv. 729, 737 (1972). However, there is some authority for the 
proposition that fetal injury gives rise to a conditional cause of action and liability at-
taches only if the child is born alive. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 21, 50 
N.W.2d 229, 231 (1951); Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16, 17 (Okla. '1967); Howell v. 
Rushing, 261 P.2d 217, 218 (Okla. 1953). 
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Finally, the Court did not discuss the status of a fetljts killed in utero 
while nonviable. Since the Court considered only th~ events of live 
birth and viability, it appears to have impliedly rejected maintenance 
of a wrongful death action for a stillborn nonviable fetus. The dissent-
ers, however, seemed to favor allowing the right of act~on. 74 
Nonetheless, Mone has significantly altered Massacthusetts law on 
fetal wrongful death. Review of the history of the law in Massachusetts 
shows a progressive expansion of the causes of actio9 based on fetal 
injury and death: the Supreme Judicial Court first de9ied all recovery 
for injury or death of the unborn; then recognized a' cause of action 
for prenatal injuries brought by a live child; later accepted an action 
based on the death of a fetus following its live birth~ and finally in 
Mone sustained an action for the death of a viable fet s in utero. This 
development of the law presents a pattern that is paral eled in the ma-
jority of other jurisdictions. Only a minority of jurisdictions that have 
. considered the issue still retain the live birth requirerhent. 75 A com-
parison of the arguments encountered with regard tb each of these 
tests will demonstrate, however, that while the viability test is prefer-
able to the live birth requirement, it is still a distant s~cond to no de-
velopmental requirement at all. I 
The major reasons advanced to support continue~ adherence to 
early precedents demanding live birth are: 76 statutory interpretation, 77 
intestacy laws/8 control of speculative and fraudule~.t claims,79 and 
ease of administration.80 The Court in Mone expresse<fl the prevailing 
criticisms of these rationales by declaring that judicial reinterpretation 
74 See note 71 supra. 
75 Jurisconsultus, 7 HousT. L. REv. 449 (1970). 
76 With regard to Massachusetts, see text at notes 57-62 supra. The Court had 
adopted the live birth test without elaboration of the theoretical basis for this position. 
See text at notes 77-80 infra for the basis of the live birth test asi reasoned in other 
jurisdictions. 1 
77 The legislatures intended to provide recovery only for the death of a living person. 
McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1971); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 
47,48-49,202 A.2d 9, II (1964); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 140, 169 
S.E.2d 440,441-42 (1969). i 
78 Only a child born alive has a legal existence independent of its ~other. Drabbels v. 
Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 22, 50 N.W.2d 229, 232 (1951); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 
Tenn. 235, 243, 319 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1958). Without a separate legal existence, a fetus 
cannot have an estate that may receive a damage award. Endresy v. Friedberg, 24 
N.Y.2d 478, 485, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70 (1969j; Carroll v. Skloff, 
415 Pa. 47, 49, 202 A.2d 9, II (1964); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 244, 319 
S.W.2d 221, 225 (1958). 
79 Live birth allows for greater certainty in determining whether the injury was the 
proximate cause of death than does stillbirth, since stillbirth may h~~e been caused by 
an independent, spontaneous abortion. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N}.2d 478, 484, 248 
N.E.2d 901, 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 69 (1969); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 400, 
146 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1966); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 49, 202 A.2d 9, II (1964). 
80 Live birth, unlike viability, is a concrete, definable event. Endr~fz v. Friedberg, 24 
N.Y.2d 478, 486, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 71 (1969~; Gordon, The Un-
born Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REV. 579, 593-94 (1965). 
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of undefined statutory terms is appropriate, the courts have recog-
nized a fetus as a separate entity (thus negating the conclusion that a 
fetus cannot have an estate), consolidation of actions and precise jury 
instructions can control the danger of speculative damage awards and 
considerations of justice have priority over convenience in judicial 
administration. 81 
That viability should be the determining factor was first suggested 
in 1900 by Judge Boggs in his dissenting opinion to the Illinois Su-
preme Court's decision in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital. 82 Against the 
court's conclusion that an infant could not maintain an action for its 
prenatal injuries because it was an inseparable part of its mother at 
the time of injury, Judge Boggs argued that a viable fetus and its 
mother are not an indivisible entity, since death of the mother would 
not necessarily terminate the fetal life.83 After reaching the viability 
stage, the fetus is capable of "independent and separate life."84 
Therefore, he reasoned, recovery should be allowed when injuries 
were sustained during the viability stage. 85 Judge Boggs did not dis-
tinguish between prenatal injury and wrongful death actions. 
The first court to accept viability as a significant factor was the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in the 1949 decision in Verkennes v. 
Corniea. 86 Defendant doctor's negligence allegedly caused the stillbirth 
of the fetus during normal delivery.87 The Court held that a wrongful 
death action could be maintained on behalf of the next of kin of a de-
ceased child who was viable at the time of death. 88 
Four years later, the Illinois Supreme Court in Amann v. Faidy 89 
adopted Judge Bogg's reasoning and expressly overruled Allaire, hold-
ing that an action may be maintained for the wrongful death of a live 
child who died as a result of prenatal injuries inflicted during the via-
bility stage. 90 
At present, the viability test, as adopted in Mone, is applied by the 
majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue. 91 The 
rationales advanced in support of allowing recovery for the stillbirth 
of a viable fetus are: (1) the ability of a viable fetus to sustain inde-
81 See notes 64-68 and accompanying text supra. 
82 184 Ill. 359,374, 56 N.E. 638, 641 (1900). 
83 /d. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641. 
84Jd. 
85 /d. at 374, 56 N.E. at 642. 
86 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). 
81 /d. at 366, 38 N.W.2d at 839. A very similar fact situation was presented 23 years 
later in Leccese in which the Supreme Judicial Court denied recovery. See text at notes 
57-62 supra. 
88 229 Minn. at 370-71, 38 N.W.2d at 841. 
89 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953). 
90 /d. at 432, 114 N.E.2d at 417-18. 
91 Jurisconsultus, 7 HousT. L. REv. 449, 459 (1970). 
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pendent existence,92 (2) legal acceptance of the viable lfetus as a sepa-
rate entity and constitutional protection of this potential life,93 (3) ju-
dicial recognition of a duty of care owed to the fetus, 94 (4) similarities 
of proof in actions based on stillbirth and live birth,9 j (5) similarities 
in damages suffered as a result of stillbirth or death irymediately after 
birth,96 and (6) considerations ofjustice.97 
The soundness of these premises underlying the viability test makes 
the viability criterion preferable to the live birth te~t. Nonetheless, 
many of the reasons supporting rejection of the live b~rth criterion in 
favor of the viability test apply equally to support rejection of the via-
bility test, in favor of allowing a cause of action for wrongful death at 
any stage in the pregnancy. i 
First, the argument based on considerations of justife applies to an 
action brought for the wrongful death of a viable or a nonviable fetus, 
since the conduct is equally tortious whatever the age of the victim. 98 
The tortfeasor would be unjustly rewarded with imm~mity where his 
92 Gorke v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 262, 181 A.2d 448, 45l (Super. Ct. 1962); 
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 
Mich. 130, 135, 188 N.W.2d 785, 787 (1971); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 283, 72 
So.2d 434, 439-40 (1954). In addition, it has been pointed out that although a viable 
fetus will not exist unaided, neither will a newborn. O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 
136, 188 N;W.2d 785, 787 (1971). I 
93
. The state has a compelling interest in potential life after the fe~us is viable. Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 <Preg. 258,267,518 
P.2d 636, 640 (1974). 
94 Acceptance of a cause of action for prenatal injuries recognizes that a duty of care 
is owed to the fetus. Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220) 226 (S.D. W. Va. 
1969); Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 261, 181 A.2d 448, 451 (Super. Ct. 
1962); State v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 183, 198 A.2d 71, 72-73 (1964); Fowler v. 
Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 612, 138 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1964). 
95 S. SPIESER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH§ 4:33,at 360-3611(1966) (hereinafter 
cited as S. SPEISER]. There is no reason to bar an action because of Broof problems: any 
difficulty. in proof would benefit the defendant. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 
95, 100, 300 So.2d 354, 358 (1974). In addition, even if the potential for fraudulent 
claims is increased, the interests in allowance of the cause of action, to bona fide plain-
tiffs outweigh the dangers of an increase in the number of fraudul~nt claims brought. 
!d. at 99, 300 So.2d at 357-58. Furthermore, once a substantive righf of a person is rec-
ognized, that right cannot be denied because of possible difficulties in proof. Stidam v. 
Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 435, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959). 
96 The loss to the survivors is equally great if the fetus dies just ptior to birth or im-
mediately following birth. White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 538, 458 P.~d 617, 623 (1969). 
Indeed, proof of damages is not even an issue under a punitive wrongful death statute 
such as that in Massachusetts (prior to 1974) and in Alabama. See Eich v. Town of Gulf 
Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 98, 300 So.2d 354, 356 (1974). 
97 The live birth test is unjust since it rewards a tortfeasor "with i~munity" if the in-
jury is sufficiently severe to cause death of the fetus in utero yet imf.oses liability for a 
less severe injury where the infant can survive birth. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 
Ala. 95, 98, 300 So.2d 354, 356 (1974); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 
373-74, 304 N.E.2d. 106, 108 (1959); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio rpp. 431,434, 167 
N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959); Baldwin v. Butcher,-W. Va.-, 184 S.E.2d 428,435 (1971). 
98 Legislation, 18 VAND. L. REv. 847, 851-52 (1965). 
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negligence caused the death of a nonviable fetus if an action would lie 
only for the death of a viable fetus 99 and no other cause of action 
could be maintained. 100 
Second, problems with proof of causation should not bear on the 
right to bring an action for the wrongful death of a viable or a nonvi-
able fetus101 nor should fear of fraudulent claims justify exclusion of 
legitimate claims. 102 Expert medical testimony will be needed to prove 
causation, regardless of fetal age; an autopsy can be performed 
equally as well on a deceased nonviable fetus, viable fetus, or 
newborn. 103 In addition, the difficulties of proof depend on the facts 
of each case: they are unrelated to the distinction between viability 
and nonviability. 104 Furthermore, problems of proof of causation in 
any prenatal death action are no greater than those involved in the 
well-recognized maternal action for miscarriage. 105 
Third, the difficulty of measuring the· damages for the death of a 
nonviable fetus is indistinguishable from the measuring problem in an 
action for the death of a viable fetus. It is unlikely that age of the 
fetus-whether viable or nonviable or newborn-will significantly af-
fect an assessment of its mental capacities and capabilities. 106 
Moreover, evidence of dam~ges in an action for wrongful death of a 
stillborn viable fetus may be identical to evidence used in a case in-
volving a nonviable fetus. In Gullborg v. Rizzo, 107 an action for the 
wrongful death of a stillborn viable fetus, the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit considered the Pennsylvania wrongful death statute, 
which mandates assessment of damages based on a decedent's pro-
spective earnings for the period of life expectancy after reaching the 
age of 21, less the anticipated expense of maintaining the decedent 
during his minority. 108 The evidence presented showed that: (1) the 
child's father was a college graduate who was earning substantial in-
come; (2) the child was normally developed for a six and one-half 
99 Comment, 1970 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 2.21, at 55. 
100 See text at notes 130-33 infra. 
101 Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 430, ll4 N.E.2d 412, 417 (l953); Damasiewicz v. 
Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 437, 79 A.2d 550, 559 (1951). Indeed, in Scott v. McPheeters, 
33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939), the court observed: "The difficulty of obtain-
ing proof of the wrong should prompt greater leniency in affording the remedy .... " 
/d. at 637, 92 P.2d at 682. 
102 Recent Developments, 70 MICH. L. REv. 729, 741 (1972). 
103 S. SPIESER. supra note 95, § 4:33, at 359. 
104 Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, llO U. 
PA. L. REV. 554, 563 (1962). 
105 Id. at 577; Legislation, 18 VAND. L. REv. 847, 853 (1965). 
106 S. SPIESER. supra note 95, § 4:33, at 359. 
107 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in rejecting the 
circuit court's interpretation of the wrongful death statute and use of the viability test in 
Gullborg, held that live birth is a prerequisite to recovery for wrongful death. Marko v. 
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966). 
108 331 F.2d at 560. 
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! 
month fetus; and (3) until the accident, the mother w experiencing a 
normal pregnancy.109 The relevance of this type of vidence is cer-
tainly not limited to situations involving viable fetuses. 
Thus, the very arguments used to support the viabi ity standard il-
lustrate the arbitrariness of that standard, and suggest that a cause of 
action for the wrongful death of a fetus should be allowed at any 
stage of pregnancy. Additional medical factors d monstrate the 
soundness of this view. 
Biolo~Pcalll, the fetus is a separate entity fro the time of 
conceptton.1 0 Medical terminology no longer classifies the fetus as vi-
able or nonviable; descriptions are based on fetal eight. 111 Thus, 
"viability" is now strictly a legal term, relevant only in t e courtroom. It 
is most difficult for expert medical witnesses to testi y whether the 
fetus was viable at the time of injury or death when a assessment of 
nonviability was not made during normal prenatal e aminations of 
the mother. 
In addition, unlike the arrival of "quickening" (wh n the first rec-
ognizable movements of the fetus occur), 112 the onset f fetal viability 
goes unnoticed by the mother.U3 Nor can the arrival of the viability 
stage be fixed at the same point for every pregnancy; it is influenced 
by fetal and maternal factors including health and utrition.U4 In-
deed, some medical authorities maintain that it is i possible to de-
termine the time when viability is reached. 115 For this reason, the re-
quirement of viability may defeat legitimate claims wh re causation is 
recognized, but viability is not established with certaint .11 6 
A number of jurisdictions have accepted the biologi al individuality 
of a nonviable fetus, to allow recovery in a prenatal i ~ury action. 117 
In Kelly v. Gregory, 118 the New York Court of Appeal held that the 
fetus is biologically separate from the mother at cone ption and thus 
is an independent legal entity to whom a duty of care s owed. 119 The 
Court rejected the viability criterion: "That [the fetus] may not live if 
109 /d. at 560-61. i 
11° Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 544, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 6917 (1953). 
111 Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Pren,tallnjuries, 110 U. 
PA. L. REv. 544,556 n.17 (1962). j 
112 DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1261 {24th ed. 1965). Quickening 
usually occurs between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy./d. 
113 Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 196 ) (dissenting opin-
ion). 
114 See generally M. ASHLEY-MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 57-112 {1962). 
110 j. GREENHILL, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF OBSTETRICS 7 {13th d. 1965). 
116 Legislation, 18 VAND. L. REV. 847, 853 {1965). 
117 Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2 727, 728 (1956); 
Sana v. Brown, 35 Ill. App. 2d 425, 426, 183 N.E.2d 187 (1962); ennett v. Hymers, 
101 N.H. 483, 486, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 368, 157 
A.2d 497, 505 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 545, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 
(1953); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960). 
118 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953). 
119 /d. at 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 
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its protection and nourishment are cut off earlier than the viable stage 
of its development is not to destroy its separability; it is rather to de-
scribe conditions under which life will not continue."120 
The viability criterion can also be attacked on the ground that the 
stage of fetal development is unrelated to the results of a tortfeasor's 
action. Both the injury to the fetus and the loss to the parents are the 
same whether or not the fetus was viable. 121 Moreover, distinctions 
based on fetal development lack justification when viewed in the con-
text of the damages recoverable under the Massachusetts wrongful 
death statute. Prior to 1973, the Massachusetts statute was punitive in 
nature: 122 recovery was based solely on the degree of the defendant's 
culpability. The current Massachusetts wrongful death statute123 is 
compensatory. Recovery is determined by tangible and intangible loss 
to the statutory beneficiaries. 124 Commentators predict that damages 
based exclusively on parental loss of companionship and comfort will 
be awarded in prenatal wrongful death actions. 125 This loss is cer-
tainly not affected by a subsequent determination of whether the fetus 
was viable at death. 
Despite the increasing number of legal commentators who advocate 
allowing a right of action for wrongful death irrespective of fetal 
age, 126 only the Georgia courts have allowed a cause of action for the 
wrongful death of a nonviable fetus. 127 In Porter v. Lassiter, 128 the 
Georgia Court of Appeals set "quickening" as the factor determinative 
of protection under the statute. 129 Although the quickening test is 
preferable to the viability test, it also creates an arbitrary and unjusti-
fiable limitation on the right to recover for the wrongful death of a 
fetus. 
Although it would be preferable for the Court simply to recognize a 
120 !d. at 544, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 
121 Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. 
PA. L. REV. 554, 564 (1962); Recent Developments, 70 MICH. L. REV. 729, 754 (1972). 
122 G.L. c. 229, § 2,asamendedthrough Acts ofl971, c. 801, §reads: "A person who (I) by his 
negligence causes the death of a person in the exercise of due care ... shall be liable in 
damages ... to be assessed with reference to the degree of his culpability .... " 
123 G.L. c. 229, § 2 (originally enacted as Acts of 1973, c. 699, § 1). 
124 The statute provides for "damages in the amount of: (I) the fair monetary value 
of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered ... including 
but not limited to compensation for the loss of the reasonably expected net income, 
services, protection, care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel 
and advice of the decedent .... " G.L. c. 229, § 2. 
125 Railroad Law, 32 ATL.L.J. 628, 630 (1968); Recent Important Tort Cases, 30 
NACCA L.J. 188, 192-98 (1964). 
126 E.g., S. SPIESER, supra note 95, § 4:33, at 361. Recent Developments, 70 MICH. L. 
REV. 729, 753-56 (1972); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to 
Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554,564 (1962); Legislation, 18 VAND. L. REv. 847, 
856 (1965). 
127 Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955). 
128Jd. 
129 /d. at 716, 87 S.E.2d at 103. 
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cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus irrespective of its 
age, an alternative and less revolutionary means of compensating pa-
rental loss is an expansion of the damages recoverable in the common 
law action for miscarriage. This may present less difficulty to the 
judiciary than expansion of the wrongful death action~. since an action 
for miscarriage is not encumbered with the definition f "person." 
Massachusetts courts have recognized a woman's ause of action 
against a tortfeasor for injury inflicted upon her t at proximately 
caused a miscarriage. 130 Awards in such personal injury actions are 
for general and special damages, including pain and silffering. 131 The 
action excludes recovery for the death of the fetus regardless of age. 132 
In addition, no compensation for the father's loss is included. 133 
To expand the damages recoverable in an action for mis<;arriage to 
include compensation for loss of the fetus, the jury could be in-
structed to consider in its award the elements of recovery in the 
statutory wrongful death action. These include assessme t of the loss of 
"companionship and comfort" of the decedent. The j ry would con-
sider the fetal age in making a determination of the emotional an-
guish of the mother due to the miscarriage. The sta e of fetal de-
velopment would also bear on the probability of no mal birth and 
postnatal development had the tort not occurred. The ge of the fetus 
would be one factor for the jury to consider; it need not be control-
ling. Moreover, the viability or nonviability of the fetus would be ir-
relevant unless the mother chose to present testimony on the issue. 
Considering these factors, the jury could arrive at a sum sufficient to 
compensate the mother for the fair monetary value of the fetus as 
well as the emotional and physical trauma of its Iss. Thus, the 
mother could recover the same type of damage award n an action for 
miscarriage as in an action for wrongful death, witho t the necessity, 
as under the present Massachusetts wrongful death sta ute, of proving 
viability of the fetus at time of death. 134 j 
Death of the mother prior to the commencement o~ the action will 
not defeat recovery. Under section 1 of chapter 228 of the General 
Laws, the common law right to recover damages for personal injuries 
130 See Reynolds v. Congress Taxi Co., 339 Mass. 778, 162 N.E.2d 64 (1959); Comeau 
v. Beck, 319 Mass. 17, 64 N.E.2d 436 (1946); Benjamin v. Holyoke St. Ry., 160 Mass. 3, 
35 N.E. 95 (1893). ! 
131 Cuddy v. L&M Equip. Co., 352 Mass. 458, 462, 225 N.E.2~ 904, 907 (1967); 
Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279,280, 52 N.E.2d 576, 577 (1943).1 
132 Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 77-78 (4th Cir. 11964); Occhipinti v. 
Rheem Mfg. Co., 252 Miss. 172, 181, 172 So.2d 186, 190 (1965). i 
133 Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1964). 
134 It is possible to hypothesize extenuating circumstances which would warrant a 
damage award in an action for miscarriage that is equal to or greater than the sum 
which would be awarded in an action for fetal wrongful death. For example, the 
mother may be unable to become pregnant again due to the injuries she sustained in the 
accident. Such personal injuries would not be considered in.a wrongful death action. 
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survives an injured person's death. In effect, this could compensate 
the father for his loss from the fetal death. If the mother does not 
die, the court alternatively may recognize a derivative action by the father. 
This would, however, require a radical expansion of the common law 
action for miscarriage, since the obvious purpose would be to compensate 
the father for death of the fetus. 
Regardless of the form of the action brought, no constitutional ob-
jections preclude allowing recovery based on the death of a nonviable 
fetus. Roe v. Wade 135 might appear to require imposition of the viabil-
ity criterion since the United States Supreme Court there held that 
the state acquires a compelling interest in preserving the fetal life 
from voluntary termination by the mother only when the fetus 
reaches the stage of viability. 136 There are, however, important dis-
tinctions between abortion laws and actions for miscarriage or fetal 
wrongful death. 
Although the state's interest may arise upon viability of the fetus, it 
does not follow that the mother's interest in preserving the fetal life 
from involuntary termination by a tortfeasor arises at the same time. 
In addition, abortion laws are criminal in nature and govern the rela-
tive rights of the mother, fetus, and state. The action for wrongful 
death and the common law action for miscarriage, on the other hand, 
are civil in nature, and do not govern such relative rights. Recovery is 
solely to vindicate the parents' interests. 137 While some prospective 
parents may choose to abort, and thus terminate their expectatiOns of 
the services and companionship of children, this should not prevent 
recovery by persons who wanted and expected the benefits of parent-
hood and genuinely suffered from the loss. 138 
It is submitted that the holding in Mone allowing a cause of action 
for death of a viable fetus is an enlightened decision in view of prior 
case law in Massachusetts. Nevertheless, the cause of action for fetal 
wrongful death is still overly restrictive. Compensation should be 
available for parental loss caused by death of the fetus, regardless of its 
age. It is suggested that expansion of the damages recoverable in the 
common law action for miscarriage or elimination of the fetal age re-
quirement in wrongful death actions be effected in future Massachusetts 
cases. 
135 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
136 /d. at 163-64. 
ELLEN MILLER WACHTEL 
137 The Supreme Court in Roe specifically drew this distinction between wrongful 
death actions and the abortion situation. 410 U.S. at 162. 
136 Recent Developments, 70 MICH. L. REV. 729, 747 (1972). 
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